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August 30, 1948 9 3

Mr. A. W. Dulles 48 Wall Street New York 5, New York

My dear Dulles:

It was certainly a very great pleasure to receive your letter of August 18 in answer to mine.

I am sorry you and Chris Herter were unable to remember the name of the other Army Captain in the committee who was so anxious to have Russia try out her experiment, but I hope the name pops into your mind as you suggest it might.

I had head that you had been delegated to make a survey of the Intelligence set-up and I was delighted to know of it. As a matter of fact. I really know nothing whatever about the present organization of the Army Intelligence Service. From what I do know, however, it meems that it has been sub-divided altogether too much and that various sub-divisions have little or no coordination and know nothing of what each is doing. There seems to have been an entire separation between the collecting activities, which we used to call the Positive Intelligence, and the subversive, which used to be known as Negative Intelligence. I am afraid you over-estimate my ability to comment on the situation in any way which might help you. While I think I do know the general way in which Intelligence should be handled, as I said above, I know so little about the present organization that comments on details would be worthless. However, I didn't intend to touch on this subject in this letter, which is simply to acknowledge and thank you for writing. There is one thing, however, which I would like to mention here, that is, the personnel of Intelligence. As you know, all officers doing Intelligence work in the Army are detailed for that purpose from some branch of the service, the higher officers being usually from the General Staff, which of course, is also detailed. Details away from troops, as you know, can, under ordinary circumstances, last no longer than four years and that means that an officer who has had no previous experience in Intelligence, will have to serve at least a year and a half or two years before he is of any good whatever to the Intelligence Service. That only leaves two years of service and if he should be again detailed on the General Staff, it is most unlikely that he will be reassigned to Intelligence work. This has been the situation from the very beginning of the Military Intelligence Service, even before World War I and it has resulted in lack of efficiency which you will find when you make your survey. It seems to me

that the only remedy for that is to form a corps of Intelligence officers who will remain in the Intelligence Service for the entirelperiod of their Army life if they prove efficient. Certainly it requires as much education, training, brains and efficiency to become a really valuable Intelligence officer as it does to become an Engineer or a Medical Officer. I mention this here because I hope you will look into the matter and if you agree with me, that you will feel justified in recommending such a move when you complete your survey. As time goes on I hope you will allow me to write you and make certain other suggestions that may or may not be valuable.

By the way, should you see your brother, John, you might ask him if he remembers who our unknown committee member might be. If we can't locate him any other way, I will write to Adolph Berle although I hesitate to do that because I realize that Berle now feels pretty badly about the stand he took at that time.

Again let me thank you for your letter and I assure you I appreciated it very much indeed.

As always,

R. H. Van Deman

RHVD:mc